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“They All Trust Mickey Mouse":
Showcasing American Capitalism in
Disney Theme Parks
Thibaut Clément
1 In  the  mid-1950s,  and  only  a  few  months  apart,  the  United  States  witnessed  two
seemingly unrelated developments that were to exert a strong influence on the future of
the country’s retail industry. Disneyland, the first theme park ever built, opened on July
17, 1955, in Anaheim, 20 miles south of Los Angeles. The Southdale Shopping Center – the
world’s first fully enclosed shopping mall – followed soon after on October 8, 1956, at
Medina, in Minnesota’s Twin Cities area. While serving apparently distinct purposes, both
addressed new conditions in post-World War II America: the slow decay of downtowns,
the need for family-friendly meeting places for middle-class suburbanites, not to mention
the rise of shopping and consumption as a leisure activity in its own right. For Disneyland
is—also—a mall: like a world unto itself, the park provided visitors with a complete array
of stores and restaurants, all matched to the surrounding area’s or attractions’ theme. 
2 And yet, for all its appearances as a self-enclosed and self-sufficient business, Disneyland
(just as later Disney parks) does not operate in realms of fantasy entirely divorced from
the  outside  world.1 Indeed,  this  paper’s  primary  intent  is  to  evaluate  how  Disney’s
showmanship has helped the company enlist the technical or financial support of major
outside corporations, whose products and messages are carefully woven into the parks’
narratives of  progress and prosperity. Shopping and exposure to corporate messages
have become so integral to the visitor’s experience and to the Disney parks’ business
model that some sociologists such as Alan Bryman now speak of “Disneyization,” meaning
“a mode of delivery [and] staging of goods and services […] to increase the appeal of
goods and services that might otherwise appear mundane or uninteresting.”2
3 But, while the parks’ promotion of capitalism and, more particularly, corporations has
been widely noted, the specific terms of their participation in the parks’ overall business
model or their implications regarding the political economy of the media have seldom
been  discussed.3 Instead,  critics  have  primarily  focused  on  how  the  presence  of
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corporations affects the parks’ ideological subtext, especially with regards to the themes
of technological progress and consumption. This article will consequently examine how
Disneyland’s unique business ecosystem has allowed the Walt Disney corporation to pitch
itself as the corporations’ ideal partner for their communication efforts with the general
public, evidencing transformation in the United States’ post-World War II economy as
well as mass media’s role in the process.
4 The analysis will  rest in part on essential,  yet often overlooked (at least in academic
discussions)  primary  sources  by  Disney  park  designers,  managers,  and  collaborators,
including fan-oriented books published by the Walt Disney corporation, as well as more
confidential internal documents collected by fans or held in university archives.4 While
the occasionally self-serving dimension of documents intended for external audiences
may of course invite caution, such first-hand accounts provide much needed new insight
into  the  creation  and  management  of  the  parks’  commercial  environment.  Those
documents will be complemented by equally untapped secondary sources, such as works
of fan scholarship, including fan-published autobiographies of park managers, “unofficial
encyclopedias,” or chronicles of the parks’ creation stories.5
5 The article’s primary focus will be on American parks, from Disneyland’s inception to the
late 1990s/early 2000s, when corporate sponsorships in Disney theme parks began to lose
steam. It will break into three parts. It will first examine how Disneyland’s environment
celebrates consumption and—much in keeping with the studio’s earlier merchandising
efforts—ties Disney images and narratives with the purchase of goods and services (I).
The paper will then turn to Disneyland’s appeals to outside partners, allowing the park to
serve as a showcase for the products and messages of large U.S. corporations (II). In its
third and last  part,  this  study will  show that,  starting with the conceptualization of
EPCOT  Center,  the  participation  of  major  conglomerates  has  become  central  to  the
design,  funding,  and contents  of  Disney parks  and attractions  (III).  In  its  concluding
remarks,  the  paper  will  eventually  analyze  the  Disney  corporation’s  relation  with
American industry through the lens of the Political Economy of Communication. 
 
Staging consumerism in Disney theme parks 
6 An early example of media convergence, the studio’s transition into the theme parks
business  meant  an  expansion  of  Disney’s  activities  not  only  across  multiple  media
platforms but into such fields of industry such as retail or service. In this regard, Disney’s
efforts to extend the media-sphere to other areas of business built on its pioneering foray
into merchandising, when the studio began to license its crowd-pleasing characters to
outside companies looking to improve their brand image and boost their sales.
 
Tying media and consumption: the case of Disney merchandise
7 Though not the first animation studio to capitalize on the sale of its characters for use by
others, Disney was the first to most systematically employ this model for its development,
using almost any opportunity to cash in on outside companies’ willingness to associate
their brand with Disney’s rising star.6 Less than a year after his first public appearance (in
the 1929 short Steamboat Willie), Mickey Mouse’s likeness already graced school writing
tablets  (the  first  Disney  merchandise  recorded)  or  embroidered  handkerchiefs.
Throughout the 1930s,  the studio’s  mascot seemed to drive sales almost as fast  as it
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captured the nation’s hearts,  saving Depression-hit companies from bankruptcy on at
least two occasions. Selling more than 235,000 units within four months, a $1 Mickey-and-
Minnie windup handcar reportedly helped bring the Lionel toy train company back to
solvency after months of sluggish sales. Ingersoll Waterbury likewise found a surprise hit
with its Mickey Mouse watch, selling 11,000 units at New York’s Macy’s on the day of its
release and allowing the company to expand its staff from 300 to 3,000 in a matter of
weeks.7 Such examples of success helped keep Disney’s licensing office busy throughout
the entire decade, securing agreements with seventy-five manufacturers in the United
States, forty-five in England, twenty in Canada (not to mention six in France, Spain, and
Portugal, each).8
8 Not  restricted  to  sole  licensing  partnerships,  Disney’s  merchandising  efforts  largely
hinged  on  the  cooperation  of  outside  companies  eager  to  exploit  the  popularity  of
Disney’s characters, as exemplified by the spectacular development in the 1930s of the
Mickey Mouse Clubs.  Developed in close cooperation with toy manufacturers,  theater
operators, and department store owners (where membership cards were procured), the
club’s role was to tie together the consumption of Disney films and Disney toys, boosting
audiences and sales for both at once. Meetings were held in movie-theaters and took on
the form of Saturday matinee programs, mixing talent contests and other “character-
building”  activities  with  a  healthy  dose  of  Disney  shorts.  Designed  as  a  mutually
beneficial  arrangement,  the  scheme  not  only  allowed  theater  operators  to  fill  their
venues when virtually no adult would patronize them; by forcing recruits to regular trips
to the department stores’ toy section, it also encouraged the year-long consumption of
toys, retailers and toy manufacturers hoped.9 
9 With over 1,500 chapters and somewhere between 150 and 200,000 members by the end of
the  decade,  the  clubs proved  an  overnight  sensation—at  a  time  when  parents  were
desperate to provide cheap forms of leisure for their entertainment-starved kids. One of
the club’s  effects  was to turn Disney shorts  into advertisements for  consumer goods
branded with Mickey Mouse or any other of the studio’s characters. Disney managers
conversely reasoned that the pervasiveness of Disney products in households kept kids
“Mickey Mouse minded” and worked as a “daily advertisement” for cartoons, earning the
studio the loyalty of young audiences.10 
 
Shoptainment in Disney theme parks
10 It is no surprise, then, that ever since its opening in 1955, Disneyland has presented itself
not only as yet another offering in Disney’s ever-expanding media galaxy but also as an
additional vehicle for the sale of products more or less closely related with the Disney
brand. To some extent, consumption has been elevated to one of the park’s underlying
themes  and  motifs,  with  shopping  itself  promoted  to  the  status  of  entertainment.
Somewhat reflected by the parks’ near-equal shops-to-attractions ratio (there currently
are 50 shops and restaurants to 49 attractions at Disneyland), this conflation of shopping
with entertainment results in part from staging techniques that immerse shoppers into
canonical story worlds to increase the appeal of products on sale.11 The presentation and
sale of real products and services in Disneyland’s imaginary locales provides a good case
of what Alan Bryman calls “hybrid consumption” (otherwise known as “shoptainment”),
that is the “transformation of shopping into play”—when, thanks to the park designers’
showmanship, “consumption becomes part of the immersion into fantasy.”12 As a result,
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shopping comes to be framed as part of a broader media experience, yet again tying
consumption with images and narratives primarily associated with the Disney brand. By
the park designers’ own admission, the purchase of souvenirs is critical to the visitor’s
symbolical participation in the park’s fictional worlds—offering a tangible payoff to an
otherwise immaterial and momentary experience: 
The shops afford guests an added dimension of experience in a time and a world
different from the everyday; they turn shopping into entertainment. […] Of course
the shops and the restaurants increase the park’s profitability; they also enhance
each ride or attraction’s value by offering themed connections to something real—
real food, real souvenirs, something guests can keep.13 
11 Disneyland’s blending of real consumption and imaginary participation is central to what
some critics have identified as the parks’ “commodification of emotions,” suggesting that
far more than mere material goods, what visitors pay for in the parks is some form of
symbolical and emotional gratification.14 As a 1962 training manual puts rather bluntly:
“The guest pays us to make him happy”—a somewhat crude rendition of Disneyland’s
original mission statement, “We create happiness.”15
12 A prominent case in point of how Disney’s showmanship serves to create an atmosphere
conducive to consumption, Main Street USA (the park’s obligatory point of entry) houses
no major attractions but instead is almost exclusively devoted to shopping. Recreating
the Main Street of a mid-sized city in the Gay Nineties, the land’s underlying theme is,
quite unabashedly, that of joyous consumerism—the celebration of an age of newfound
prosperity  and material  abundance for  all,  as  a  result  of  mass  production and mass
consumption.16 Disney’s is a business-friendly take on the Gilded Age—one expunged of
all  traces of social  strife and discontent (in what was otherwise a turbulent era) and
where  business  is  presented  as  inherently  conducive  to  technological  and  economic
progress.17 This vision of a post-scarcity America is  supported by the street’s vibrant
visual environment, as exemplified by the shop’s oversized windows (lower than usual, so
that  children can peer  inside),  their  constantly  replenished shelves,  as  well  as  their
extremely ornate façades, whose lavish decorative details and elaborate millworks bear
witness to advances in mass production techniques.18 As one official Disney guidebook has
it, Main Street is a tribute to “Walt’s heartfelt patriotism,” “a place where people are
friendly, hard work is rewarded, and everybody shares a dream for a better life.”19 It is
the  very  spirit  of  American  capitalism  and  its  virtues  that  the  land’s  Emporium  at
Orlando’s Magic Kingdom aims to demonstrate. Meant to convey the success story of its
imaginary  owner,  the  store’s  flourishing  business  is  made especially  apparent  by  its
luxurious  expansion.  The  new  wing’s  modern  Edwardian  style  provides  a  striking
contrast with the Victorian decoration of the store’s original location, suggesting growth
over time as well as conveying something of the owner’s Protestant work ethics, whereby
profits have been systematically reinvested in the means of production.20 
 
Corporate partnerships in Disney theme parks
13 Parks serve as a platform not just for the sale and promotion of Disney-related products,
but also of goods and brands from outside companies. Not only does the inclusion of
everyday products and brands help increase the realism of their fantasy environments, it
also  allows  parks  to  operate  as  promotional  vehicles  for  large  corporations  while
significantly increasing their profit margin in the process.
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 Sponsors and lessees
14 One such form of corporate partnership in Disneyland is the sale of commercial leases to
outside companies.  Born out of  technical  and economic necessity,  these partnerships
allowed lessees to provide technical help and expertise in sectors of business (especially
the service industry) initially unfamiliar to the Disney corporation. Just as importantly,
those deals allowed the company to not only offload the costs of staffing and operating a
number of shops and restaurants, but also collect rents, providing a much-needed source
of additional revenue at a time when few investors backed Disney’s project yet.21 At the
park’s opening in 1955, Bank of America was thus left in charge of running and staffing
Main Street U.S.A.’s bank.22 Somewhat more surprisingly, five agribusiness giants were
made responsible for managing restaurants serving the products they had become most
famous for. Those were Frito Lay, Aunt Jemima’s, Chicken of the Sea, Swift & Co, and
Maxwell House.23 These early partnerships most likely served as opportunities for skills
transfers from the outside in, when the Disney corporation grew confident that not only
shops represented a steady source of extra revenue but also that it could run them itself.24
A great  many  leases  were  therefore  not  renewed upon their  expiration,  and  so  did
Maxwell’s  Coffee  House  close  within  two years—only  to  be  taken over  internally.  In
addition to leases, other commercial partnerships were struck for the sale of distribution
rights to a few corporations essentially paying for exclusive access to Disneyland’s closed
market—much  in  contradiction  of  the  park’s  apparent  glorification  of  economic
competition. Those deals restricted not only the items that visitors could buy (with Kodak
the sole purveyor of film), but also what products restaurants could use (such as Oscar
Mayer hot dogs or Borden milk).25
15 Not  just  restricted  to  leases  or  distribution  rights,  commercial  deals  with  outside
companies  also involved the sale  of  advertisement real  estate,  with parks serving as
showcases  for  the  products  and  know-how  of  American  titans  of  industry.  By
“sponsoring” an attraction, companies would not only attach their names to it but also
display  their  products  in  thematically  appropriate  environments,  exposing  them  to
millions of captive visitors.  Initially limited to the attractions’ queue areas, corporate
exhibitions  grew  into  attractions  in  their  own  rights—as  exemplified  by  the  wildly
popular Monsanto Home of the Future. Designed and built by Monsanto, the attraction
was meant to demonstrate advances in the plastics industry, as applied to construction
and home appliances. Naturally enough, Tomorrowland’s attractions offered countless
opportunities for sponsorship by technological corporations like General Electric,  Bell
Systems, or Monsanto—which, from 1955 to 1972, took on alone the sponsorship of four
attractions in total (see Table n° 1: List of Disneyland’s 33 participants, 1967).26
 
Table n° 1: List of Disneyland’s 33 participants, 1967
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Santa Fe & Disneyland Railroad, 1955-1974
Atlantic-Richfield
Fantasyland  Autopia,  1959-1999;  Tomorrowland
Autopia, 1959-2000
Aunt  Jemima’s  (originally  a
subsidiary of Quaker Oats Company)
Aunt  Jemima’s  Pancake  House,  1955-1962,  later  Aunt
Jemima’s Kitchen, 1962-1970
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Bank of America Bank of Main Street, 1955-1992
Bell Telephone Bell telephone Systems Phone Exhibits, 1960-1984
Carnation 
Carnation  Ice  Cream  Parlor,  1955-1997,  later  renamed
Carnation Café, 1997-ongoing
C & H Sugar C&H Sugar Corner, Market House, 1965-1970
Chicken  of  the  Sea,  Van  Camp
Company
Pirate  Ship  Restaurant,  1955-1982  and  Skull  Rock
Restaurant, 1961-1982
Coca-Cola
Refreshment  corner,  1955-present;  Spirit  of
Refreshment,  1998-present;  Tomorrowland  Terrace,
1967-present
Douglas Aircraft Moonliner, 1962-1967
Frito  Lay  (merged  with  Pepsi-Co  in
1965)
Casa de Fritos, 1955-2001
General Electric Carousel of Progress, 1967-1973
Global Van Lines Main Street Lockers and Storage, 1963-1979
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. PeopleMover, 1967-1995
Hallmark Hallmark Card Shop, 1960-1985
Hills Bros. Coffee Inc. Hills Bros. Coffee House and Coffee Garden, 1958-1976
INA-Insurance  Company  of  North
America 
Carefree Corner, 1956-1974
Ken-L Ration (originally a  subsidiary
of Quaker Oats Company)
Ken-L Land Pet Motel, 1958-1967
Kodak Kodak Camera Center, 1955-1977; 1977-1994.
Lincoln Savings and Loan Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln, 1965-1973
Monsanto Co.
Hall  of  Chemistry,  1955-1966;  House  of  the  Future,
1957-1967; Adventure Thru Inner Space, 1967-1972
Pendleton Pendleton Woolen Mills Dry Goods Store, 1955-1990
Pepsi-Cola 
Golden Horseshoe Revue, 1955-1982
Country Bear Jamboree, 1971-1981
Spice Islands Le Gourmet, 1966-1998
Sunkist Growers, Inc.
River  Belle Terrace;  Sunkist  Citrus  House,  1960-1989;
Sunkist, I Presume, 1962-1992
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Sunsweet Growers Inc. Market House, 1965-1970
Swift & Co.
Red  Wagon  Inn,  1955-1965;  Chicken  Plantation,
1955-1962; Market House, 1955-1965
Timex Watches and Clocks, 1955-1971
United Air Lines The Enchanted Tiki Room, 1964-1973
The Upjohn Co. The Upjohn Pharmacy, 1955-1970
The  Welch’s  Grape  Juice  Company
Inc.
Welch’s Grape Juice Stand, 1956-1981
Western Printing and Litho Co. Story Book Shop, 1955-1995
Wurlitzer Wurlitzer Music Hall, 1955-1968
Compiled from: Strodder, The Disneyland Encyclopedia.
16 Even  corporate  lessees  operating  restaurants  and  businesses  at  Disneyland  came  to
regard their  involvement primarily  as  publicity  stunts,  as  the exorbitant  leases  soon
demanded  by  the  Disney  corporation  eventually  made  all  hopes  of  breaking  even
irrelevant. Lessees, Disney managers argued, were to regard their participation from a
pure publicity standpoint and content themselves with basking in the park’s alleged “halo
effect”—namely, the privilege of associating the participants’ operations with one of the
United States’ most beloved institutions.27 In truth, Disney managers were only taking
advantage of motivations that had been apparent all along. Food conglomerates such as
Aunt Jemima’s or Frito Lay had, of course, no particular interest in running a restaurant
of their own, if not to reinforce their brand’s image and connection with the country’s
culinary traditions by making their homes at Main Street U.S.A. or Frontierland.
 
Disneyland’s twin functions: medium and shopping center
17 As both a retail outlet and a medium, Disneyland is also at least in part the product of
similar conditions which gave rise to the shopping center and television, as well as served
similar  objectives.  Both  developments  supported  new  marketing  techniques  for  the
promotion of consumption. Madison Avenue was quick to make television its medium of
choice, allowing the advertising industry to develop its scope and methods dramatically
over the decade.28 The development of malls and large national retail chains likewise
made  the  United  States’  retail  environment  increasingly  compatible  with  product
standardization and mass consumption. 
18 In this regard, Disneyland’s twin function helps address the nature of its relations with
outside companies, which are at once tenants in Disneyland’s commercial environment
and advertisers  on its  “show.” The Walt  Disney Company thus adopted the standard
television practices  of  corporate  sponsorship of  entertainment  or  product  placement
within show content.29 Disneyland likewise replicated not only the form and function of
1950s malls but also their mode of operation and tenant selection. The park presented the
same inward-looking, pedestrian, and semi-public environment, surrounded with ample
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parking space and in direct proximity with major thoroughfares (in Disneyland’s case, the
Santa  Ana  Freeway,  completed  1956).  Crucially,  it  also  borrowed  shopping  centers’
practice of “merchandising,”—the fine-tuned assortment of shops and lessees, reflecting
identical  efforts  among mall  developers  and operators  for  the creation of  a  planned
market environment.30 
19 Four criteria seem to have guided the choice of participants, and preference was given to
companies (1) whose wares,  services,  or brand image were a good fit  with the land’s
theme; and (2) whose expertise was needed for running the park or supplying content.
Participants were also expected to (3) be prosperous enough not to mind the high costs of
running an operation at Disneyland; and (4) not compete with other corporations already
present in the park. This final condition suffered occasional exceptions. Lincoln Savings
and Loans, for example, took up the sponsorship of Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln, even
though Bank of America already was already running the Bank of Main Street. Both Coca-
Cola and Pepsi-Cola were likewise initially sold at Disneyland, with Pepsi the sponsor of
both Frontierland’s Golden Horseshoe Revue and Bear Country’s Country Bear Jamboree
until 1981.
20 Unsurprisingly,  major  corporations  represented  in  Disneyland  (many  the  product  of
mega-mergers  and  near-monopolistic  operations)  were  from  sectors  of  industry
identified  with  post-World  War  II  economic  growth,  whose  contribution  to  and
promotion of consumerism was essential in shaping new ways of life. This was especially
true of the automotive industry,  represented by car tires manufacturer Goodyear,  oil
company Richfield, or carmaker AMC, briefly Circarama’s sponsor (1955-1960). A leading
contributor  to  the  United  States’  economic  growth,  the  car  industry  at  one  point
employed up to one-sixth of the country’s total workforce and soon established itself as a
decisive  promoter  of  the  consumerist  lifestyle,  through  its  practice  of  planned
obsolescence, its reliance on the advertising industry, or even its indirect contribution to
sprawl  and  resulting  malls.  Also,  prominently  represented  in  the  parks  were  the
agribusiness sector (which in the 1950s witnessed a boom in processed, and especially
frozen, foods), the plastics industry (with polymers like DuPont’s polyethylene the new
material  of  choice  for  mass-produced  consumer  goods),  or  the  service  sectors.  The
presence of both INA-Insurance Company of North America and Bank of America notably
spoke to America’s new suburban, consumerist condition. INA emerged from World War
II  one  of  the  United  States’  largest  insurance  companies  thanks  in  part  to  its
tremendously successful all-inclusive homeowners policy, while Bank of America and its
rivals thrived by providing credit (home loans or consumer credit) on levels unseen since
the 1920s.31 
 
Disney, the middleman between corporations and the
public: the case of EPCOT
21 Disney’s showmanship served corporate interests so well that cooperation with outside
companies expanded well beyond the confines of Disneyland to the New York World Fair
of  1965-1966,  where  Disney’s  Imagineers  (the  Disney  corporation’s  term  for  park
designers)  designed four pavilions—three of  which were funded by corporations (the
fourth, by the State of Illinois). Upon the fair’s closure, all pavilions were repatriated to
Disneyland, providing for the park’s cheap and rapid development.32 
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22 Disney’s work at the fair was to set a precedent for the funding of parks and attractions,
with development and construction costs gradually passed on to “sponsors,” now forking
out between 80 to 90% of the funds for the attractions of EPCOT. Developed in close
cooperation with large American corporations, the “Experimental Prototype Community
of Tomorrow” was designed as a kind of permanent world fair where Disney hoped to
serve as a “middleman” between consumers and faceless conglomerates suffering from a
trust  deficit  (for  a  complete  list  of  “primary  sponsors,”  see  table  n°2).33 As  former
president of Imagineering Marty Sklar explains:
The  whole  idea  [behind  EPCOT]  was  Walt  would  travel  around  to  the  great
laboratories  of  American industry,  the GE labs,  the Sarnoff  labs  that  were RCA,
DuPont, Ford, and IBM. Every time Walt would come to one of those labs they’d trot
out the latest thing they were working on. Quite often they’d have nothing to do
with products they were selling, and Walt would say, “When can I buy a product
based on that  technology?” They’d look at  him and say,  “We don’t  know if  the
public is interested in this.” Walt came to think that he could be a middle-man
between industry and the public—showcasing and demonstrating products and new
ideas. Really that’s how EPCOT started to evolve. […] [Industry leaders would say:]
“Look,  the  public  doesn’t  trust  what  industry  tells  them,  they  don’t  trust  what
government tells them, but they all trust Mickey Mouse. You people have a role.” 34
23 Against  a  payment of  at  least  35 million dollars  (but  sometimes twice that  amount),
participants were given made-to-measure pavilions to educate the public on significant
contemporary issues in the areas energy, transportation, food, or communications—more
often than not reflecting the interests of corporations and turning the Disney company
into their more or less willing mouthpiece. Exxon’s now-defunct Universe of Energy was
thus  generally  dismissive  of  renewable  energies  (not  to  say  entirely  silent  on global
warming),  while Kraft’s  (now Chiquita’s)  Living with the Land presents the future of
agriculture as a high-tech, dirt-free venture, mostly dependent on corporate innovations.
35 
 
Table n° 2: List of EPCOT’s “primary sponsors”
Spaceship Earth (1982-present)
Bell systems (1982-1984)
AT&T (1984-2004)
Siemens AG (2004-present)
World of Motion (1982-1996) General Motors (1982-1996)
The Land (1982-present)
Kraft Foods (1982-1992)
Nestlé (1993-2009)
Chiquita (2011-present)
The American Adventure (1982-present)
Coca-Cola (1982-1998)
American Express (1982-2002)
Universe of Energy (1982-2017) ExxonMobil (1982-2004)
Horizons (1983-1999) General Electric (1983-1999)
Journey into Imagination (1983-present) Kodak (1983-1998)
The Living Seas (1986-present) United Technology (1986-2001)
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Wonders of Life (1989-2007) MetLife (1989-2007)
Test Track (1999-present)
General Motors (1999-2012)
Chevrolet (2012-present)
Mission: Space (2003-present)
Hewlett Packard (2003-2015)
Hewlett Packard Enterprise (2015-present)
Compiled from Koenig, Realityland.
24 EPCOT’s considerable sponsorship fees meant that the participants’ prominence in the
park’s environment was increased considerably, should it be only because the pool of
sponsors was now reduced to a handful of mega-corporations only—each the exclusive
representative a major field of US industry. Some of Disneyland’s historical participants
(Bell, GE, Kodak or Coca-Cola) expanded their presence to EPCOT, while a few newcomers
(GM, ExxonMobil,  United Technologies or Metlife) were brought in. The situation was
somewhat different at World Showcase: while funding was initially sought directly from
national governments, the majority of national pavilions ended up funded by business
consortiums from the countries represented.36
25 The unprecedented sums expected from Exxon and other sponsors also meant that their
participation alone largely  determined the park’s  coming into existence,  hence their
considerable influence over the attractions’ contents and “subjective” treatment of facts,
as  one  Imagineer  regrets.37 While  initially  adamant  that  the  shows  were  not
“propaganda,”38 Marty  Sklar  has  recently  come  to  acknowledge  that  “we  were
undoubtedly very naïve about how many suggestions they [corporate sponsors] would
have—and how vocally they argued for their point of view. […] Let’s just say there were a
number of “facts” we thought could be more objective.”39 That the Disney company came
to be so reliant on outside corporations for EPCOT’s creation is hardly a surprise, since
the project  was originally  intended if  not  as  a  park,  at  least  as  a  “showcase for  the
American free enterprise system” (loaded rhetoric at the time of the Cold War). As Walt
Disney declared in his 1966 “EPCOT film”:
We think the need is for starting from scratch on virgin land and building a special
kind  of  new  community.  So  that’s  what  EPCOT  is:  an  Experimental  Prototype
Community that will always be in the state of becoming. 
[A] project like this is so vast in scope that no one company alone could make it a
reality. But if we can bring together the technical know-how of American industry
and  the  creative  imagination  of  the  Disney  organization,  I’m  confident  we  can
create—right here in Disney World—a showcase to the world of the American free
enterprise system.
26 This televised address to the people of Florida was designed to sway the state’s lawmakers
into adopting a law presented as vital for the project’s completion—one that would grant
Disney  with  a  private  government,  complete  with  powers  normally  held  by  Florida
counties  and  cities.  Another  example  of  how  Disney’s  “showmanship”  allowed  the
company to rally both corporate and government support by weaving “grand narratives”
of technological progress, EPCOT was at the time of the address conceptualized as a real,
futuristic community of 20,000 inhabitants. Drawing directly from Disneyland’s hub-and-
spoke layout, EPCOT was thus to serve as test-market for the very corporations behind
the  city’s  innovative  transport,  building  and  communication  technologies.  While
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ultimately not completed in the form originally presented by Disney, this grand narrative
proved enough to secure the cooperation of  Florida legislators,  who overwhelmingly
supported the adoption of Disney’s proposed “Reedy Creek Improvement District Act.”40
Just as importantly, Disney’s tales of progress through private initiative helped secure the
technical cooperation of four industrial and technological giants in the overall design and
construction  of  not  just  EPCOT  but  of  the  entire  Disney  World  resort—a  gigantic
undertaking twice the size of Manhattan island, with US Steel, Monsanto, RCA Systems
and  Aerojet  General  Corporation  developing  new  technologies  for  prefabricated
construction, communication networks, or innovative trash collection systems.41
27 Keen to publicize their involvement in EPCOT, those corporations came to adopt Disney’s
utopian rhetoric, testifying (if only publicly) to the persuasiveness of Disney’s vision for a
better future driven by private corporations. This is especially apparent in the following
sentences, excerpted from a 1969 press release published upon the start of Disney World’s
construction—“a major step toward the realization of Walt Disney’s master plan” and “his
concept for the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow,” in Disney C.E.O. Donn
Tatum’s  words.42 Drawing  an  explicit  connection  between  the  Disney  corporation,
American  industry,  and  the  onward  march  of  progress,  Edward  J.  Bock,  Monsanto’s
president and CEO thus stated:
The late Walt Disney was a man who always recognized the constant emergence of
exciting ideas and products of American industry. He knew, also, that when such
ideas and products were introduced in an appropriate environment, new elements
of a better life for millions of people would be the inevitable outcome. […]
To us, this is a challenging relationship. Just as the Disney organization is readying
itself for the world of tomorrow, so are we at Monsanto. As partners, I feel sure our
mutual interests can be furthered. […] We look forward, therefore, to Walt Disney
World becoming an adventurous research and development “laboratory” for our
company.43
28 Much in the same spirit, RCA’s Chase Morsey likewise declared:
Looking ahead the total system is expected to contribute to basic improvements in
education, health, safety, utility operations, municipal government, transportation,
and recreation. Over the full life of the program, there will evolve for the citizens of
EPCOT a vivid picture of what electronics can do for life in the 21st century. […] We
take it as a privilege to work with the Disney organization in a project which holds
so much promise for the future of human society.44
 
Concluding remarks: Disney Theme Parks and the
Political Economy of the Media
29 With the completion of EPCOT in 1982, the Disney company had become almost entirely
reliant on outside companies, whose contribution no longer represented a source of extra
revenue but became central to the park’s contents and business model. However, there is
now every indication that the system of partnerships has come to its end. Nine of EPCOT’s
original “participants” have failed to renew their sponsorships of attractions over the last
decade, leaving only four official sponsors in the park—General Motors, now represented
by its Chevrolet subsidiary, Hewlett Packard, Siemens, and Chiquita. As some Imagineers
readily admit, many pavilions were vanity projects for their sponsors’ CEOs, to the effect
that  sponsorships  were  often  nixed  upon  the  latter’s  retirements.  What’s  more,  the
pavilions’ benefits were hard to measure and, if anything, never seemed quite worth their
initial costs.45
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30 Also, while the parks’ environments have for more than sixty years now been carefully
calibrated to encourage consumption among visitors, Disney’s formula has proved not
entirely foolproof—as famously demonstrated by the economic woes of Disneyland Paris.
The French park’s troubles have resulted not so much form low visitor turnout (only
marginally below initial projections) as from disappointing per-capita sales in the park’s
many shops and restaurants. Indeed, using their astounding (and until now unparalleled)
success at Tokyo Disneyland as an indication of their appeal on foreign markets, Disney
managers  had mistakenly  come to  believe  that  demand for  Disney merchandise  was
universal, in complete disregard of the Europeans’ thriftier spending habits.46
31 Yet, beyond the shopping patterns of individual visitors lie larger scale issues: the parks’
systematic promotion of consumption and free-market competition suggests that parks
(like much of the media) serve functions essential to capitalism itself. Over the years, the
Disney company has made itself something of an unavoidable meeting point between the
country’s corporations and the general public, shedding light on features and processes
central to the media’s role in a capitalist economy—as notably argued by proponents of
the political economy of the media.47 First identified in the pioneering work of economist 
Dallas  Smythe,  such  features  and  processes  notably  include  synergy,  audience
commodification, audience labor, and, finally, the “consciousness industry.” 
32 Synergy (and its corollaries, diversification, concentration, and integration) has surely
become the most outstanding and discussed of all of the Disney corporation’s modes of
operation,  48 with  the  park  acting  as the  catalyst  for  the  closer  integration  of  the
company’s  various  business  operations.  Walt’s  entry  in  the  theme  park  business
prompted the studio to diversify its lines of business and expand horizontally to other
media (such as television), and vertically to non-media sectors (such as retail or service),
allowing the company to grow into “a sort of Tennessee Valley Authority of leisure and
entertainment”49 and  now  the  world’s  second  largest  media  conglomerate.  Disney
synergy occurs not just within (with the cross-promotion of transmedia franchises from
one media platform to another) but also without, with skills and technology transfers
from the  outside  in  and  vice-versa.  From the  outside  in,  with  lessees  and  sponsors
extending their help and expertise in the studio’s first step into the service industry, the
creation  of location-  or  theme-appropriate  content  for  Disneyland’s  or  EPCOT’s
attractions, or even the use and development of proprietary technologies in the parks.50
From the inside out, with the Disney company now in the business of showcasing and
repackaging  corporations,  or  even  training  outside  employees  to  the  parks  and
hospitality industries’ highest service standards.51
33 Yet another way in which parks fulfill media functions otherwise essential to industry in
a capitalist  economy is by selling and “producing audiences,  en masse and in specific
demographically desirable forms, for advertisers”52—a process first identified as audience
commodification by Smythe.53 Far from the media’s end product, content fulfills purely
instrumental functions and serves merely as “an inducement (gift, bribe or ‘Free lunch’)
to recruit potential members of the audience and to maintain their loyal attention.”54
While participant affairs now represent only a marginal aspect of the parks’ business
model, Disney was initially quick to capitalize on corporations’ interest in using parks as
yet another advertising channel,  making their contribution crucial  to Disneyland’s or
EPCOT’s overall feasibility and success.
34 Somewhat anticipating later debates about online media, prosumerism, and the blurring
of  labor-leisure  boundaries,55 Smythe  elaborated  that  as  audiences  are  sold  to
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corporations,  so  are  they  put  to  work.  Maintaining  that  “audiences’  exposure  to
advertising should be considered labor that added value to the audience commodity,”
audience labor was thus to be considered as the inevitable corollary of  the audience
commodity. 56 That corporate exhibitions were originally branded as “free” (when other
attractions required admission tickets, before the adoption of all-inclusive entry tickets
in  1982)  paradoxically  points  to  their  transactional  nature,  allowing  the  audience’s
attention time to serve as payment for their educational or entertainment value.57 Yet
audience  labor  in  the  parks  far  exceeds  what  has  only  recently  been  termed  “the
attention economy” and extends all  the way to an underlying cognitive or emotional
economy. Much in the way that the employees’ work is presented as mere play,58 so are
visitors  required  to  perform some tasks—such as  exhibiting  appropriate  attitudes  or
feelings, with audience’s emotions literally put “on show” and a key ingredient to the
entertainment on offer in the parks.59 
35 While  already discussed at  some length,  the  ideological  function of  the  parks  might
likewise be best understood within the framework of Smythe’s political economy of the
media—a role that Smythe refers to as “the consciousness industry,” that is to say the
“pervasive  reinforcement  of  the  ideological  basis  of  the  capitalist  system”  for  the
production of “audiences prepared to be dutiful consumers.”60 In their efforts to promote
corporations, parks likewise serve an overt ideological agenda especially conducive to the
consumption of industry’s products,  that is to say: the promotion of capitalism as an
expression of  American genius (as suggested by Main Street U.S.A.’s  very name),  the
presentation  of  corporations  as  engines  of  progress,  and  their  naturalization  as  the
inevitable product of the free enterprise system. Yet, parks usually operate as closed,
harmonious, and tightly regulated markets (the product of Disney’s “invisible hand”),
sometimes even shielded from legal obligations otherwise imposed on competitors.61 Such
ambiguities  (namely,  that  monopolistic  or  government-supported business  operations
might serve as valid examples of the United States’ “free enterprise system”) might help
present the public with a more readily acceptable version of free-market capitalism—one
apparently  free  of  cut-throat  competition  and  other  destructive  excesses.  Disney’s
program  for  the  voluntary  cooperation  of  benevolent  conglomerates  likewise  helps
suggest that private companies are best left to their own devices, exempt from red-tape,
or  even  acting  as  substitutes  to  government  itself.  Yet,  as  the  product  of  allegedly
mutually advantageous arrangement between the Florida state and the California studio,
Disney’s  private  government  built  on  earlier  patterns  of  business-government
cooperation  (which  the  Disney  studio  experienced  firsthand,  as  one  of  the  nation’s
foremost suppliers of World War II propaganda), expanding it to areas well beyond the
Cold  War-era  Military-Industrial  Complex.  Maybe  even  more  significantly,  Disney’s
rationale  for  EPCOT  appealed  to  1920s  notions  of  “business  progressivism”  and
“associationalism” of the kind supported by Herbert Hoover—in which self-regulating
businesses  would contribute expertise  in the areas  of  “scientific  rationalization” and
“social engineering” and essentially form a private government conducive to “national
reform, greater stability, and steady expansion.”62 Much in the way that Main Street was a
vision of Gilded Age America tinged with nostalgia, so was EPCOT’s vision not of the
future, but of the past. 
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ENDNOTES
1. Disney now owns and runs twelve parks around the globe, with six parks in the United States
alone.  (This  includes  two  parks  at  Disneyland  Resort,  Anaheim,  California,  and  four  at  Walt
Disney  World,  Orlando,  Florida.  Japan,  France  and  now  China  each  have  two  Disney  parks).
Disneyland provided the basis for all of Disney’s flagship Magic Kingdom-style parks, first at Walt
Disney World’s Magic Kingdom (open 1971) and later, Tokyo Disneyland (1981), Disneyland Paris
(1992), Hong  Kong  Disneyland  (2005),  and  Shanghai  Disneyland  (2016).  The  first  park  to
consciously deviate from Disneyland’s tried-and-true formula was EPCOT Center (Walt Disney
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World, 1982) – a kind of permanent world fair, whose broad themes include technology (Future
World) and international cooperation (World Showcase).
2. Alan Bryman, The Disneyization of Society (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 159.
3. For a literature review on Disney theme parks’ glorification of private corporations, see: Alan
Bryman, Disney and His Worlds (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 113–26.
4. For examples of fan-oriented books, see: John Hench and Peggy Van Pelt, Designing Disney (New
York: Disney Editions, 2003); Marty Sklar, Dream It! Do It!: My Half-Century Creating Disney’s Magic
Kingdoms,(New York:  Disney Editions,  2013);  Alex Wright, The Imagineering Field Guide to  Magic
Kingdom at Walt Disney World (New York: Disney Editions, 2009).
For examples of internal documents collected by fans or held in university archives, see: WED
Enterprises, Safety and Operations Manual: You’re Onstage at Disneyland (Burbank: WED Enterprises,
1962),  http://matterhorn1959.blogspot.com/2007/02/sop-saturday-on-sunday-youre-onstage-
at.html;  WED  Enterprises,  “Disneyland:  Where  You  Leave  Today  ...  and  Visit  the  World  of
Yesterday and Tomorrow” (Burbank, January 1, 1953), 159, Harrison “Buzz” Price Papers, http://
stars.library.ucf.edu/buzzprice/159.
5. The Walt Disney Company, a notoriously secretive company, has now closed its archives to
outside researchers as well as closely monitors what its employees are allowed to say in public. In
the absence of better alternatives and direct access to primary sources, works of fan scholarship
have proved an invaluable and generally reliable source of information, giving credence to Henry
Jenkins’s  remarks  that  fans  are  indeed  “the  true  experts”  in  the  effort  of  “knowledge
production”  on  popular  culture.  The  existence  of  such  sources,  incidentally,  testifies  to  the
agency and criticality of  park users and,  most prominently,  park fans – far from Eco’s  (and,
incidentally,  many other  critics’)  earlier  visions  of  Disneyland as  a  “place  of  total  passivity”
where visitors behave like “robots.” While the paper’s primary focus is on the parks’ design and
business, the intended role of audiences will be explored more specifically in the latter part of
the  discussion.  See:  Henry  Jenkins, Textual  Poachers:  Television  Fans  &  Participatory  Cultur e
(Routledge, 1992),  86; Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality:  Essays (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1986), 48. 
For examples of all three kinds of fan scholarship works mentioned above, see: Jack Lindquist
and Melinda J. Combs, In Service to the Mouse: My Unexpected Journey to Becoming Disneyland’s First
President:  A  Memoir  (Chapman  University  Press/Neverland  Media,  2011);  Chris  Strodder, The
Disneyland  Encyclopedia:  The  Unofficial,  Unauthorized,  and  Unprecedented  History  of  Every  Land,
Attraction, Restaurant, Shop, and Event in the Original Magic Kingdom (Santa Monica: Santa Monica
Press,  2008);  David  Koenig, Realityland:  True-Life Adventures  at  Walt  Disney  Worl d  (Irvine:
Bonaventure Press, 2007).
6. This distinction goes to the Fleischer Studio, whose Felix the Cat spearheaded the studio’s
licensing efforts. See: Chris Pallant, Demystifying Disney: A History of Disney Feature Animation (New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 14.
7. Bob Thomas, Walt Disney: An American Original (New York: Disney Editions, 1994), 106–8.
8. J.P. Telotte, The Mouse Machine: Disney and Technology (Champaign: University of Illinois Press,
2008), 98.
9. Disney’s entry into merchandising and, more specifically, the sale of goods marketed toward
children  points  to  transformations  typical  of  the  Great  Depression,  when  corporations  and
manufacturers were forced to create new markets to subsist. Thanks to its efforts, Disney proved
a leading contributor to children’s entry into the marketplace – as consumers, if not as workers.
(Child labor in the United States was only permanently eradicated by law in the late 1930s, with
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
10. In a 1931 letter to Carl Solloman, Roy Disney – Walt’s brother – thus notably wrote: “The sale
of  a  doll  to  any member  of  a  household  is  a  daily  advertisement  in  that  household  for  our
cartoons  and  keeps  them  all  ‘Mickey  Mouse  minded’.  […]  We  feel  we  should  publicize  our
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character from every angle and accept from every opportunity.” See: Richard DeCordova, “The
Mickey in Macy’s Window: Childhood, Consumerism, and Disney Animation,” in Disney Discourse:
Producing the Magic Kingdom, ed. Eric Smoodin (New York: Routledge, 1994), 205. Most remarks
presented here on the Mickey Mouse Clubs are drawn from DeCordova’s illuminating essay on
the topic. 
11. In 1953, the park was slated to open with a total of 73 rides, exhibitions, and attractions, and
93 shops, restaurants, and refreshment stands (WED Enterprises, “Disneyland: Where You Leave
Today.”) A 1955 map of the park brings those numbers down to 53 and 56, respectively. See: WED
Enterprises, The  Story  of  Disneyland,  with  a  Complete  Guide  to  Fantasyland,  Tomorrowland,
Adventureland,  Frontierland,  Main  Street  U.S.A.  (Anaheim,  Calif.,  1955),  http://
www.disneybymark.com/1955-Guidebook-DisneybyMark.pdf. 
12. Bryman, Disney and His Worlds, 159.
13. Hench and Van Pelt, Designing Disney, 63.
14. By this expression, one refers to the process by which emotions are sold on the marketplace.
As such, it is especially related to “emotional labor,” i.e., when staff is required by management
to convey specific feelings when carrying out specific tasks. For a discussion of emotional labor,
see: Hochschild 1983. For an analysis of emotional labor in Disney parks, see: John Van Maanen
and Gideon Kunda, “Real Feelings: Emotional Expressions and Organization Culture,” Research in
Organizational Behavior 11 (1989): 43–102.
15. WED Enterprises, You’re Onstage at Disneyland.
16. Consumerism is here used in the sense of the Oxford English Dictionary: “Name given to a
doctrine advocating a continual increase in the consumption of goods as the basis of a sound
economy.” The Webster Dictionary provides another useful definition: “a preoccupation with and
an inclination toward the buying of consumer goods.”
In a chapter devoted to the topic, Alan Bryman identifies three components to consumerism in
Disney theme parks: 1. parks are environment meant to maximize consumption opportunities; 2.
they suggest that self-accomplishment is possible through purchases that support one’s sense of
identity and desired lifestyle; and 3. they present shopping as a form of entertainment. 
As  Roger  Swaggler  notes,  the  notion  of  consumerism  has  in  time  come  to  bear  negative
undertones (as “excessive” or “soulless”), and so have early critics of Disney parks like Umberto
Eco suggested that, by blurring the line between “real” and fake,” Disneyland “falsif[ies] our will
to buy” and comes across as the “quintessence of the consumer ideology” 
However,  new understandings of  popular audiences and cultural  practices in the wake of  de
Certeau have since dismissed consumption as necessarily naïve or passive and made it another
possible avenue for the expression of the park visitors’ agency. In a widely influential passage
from The Practice of Everyday Life, Certeau thus presents consumption as creative process – a mode
of production in its own right, which “manifest[s] itself … through its ways of using the products
imposed by a dominant economic order,” as well  as a tactical  activity which allows users to
pursue their own ends and interests. 
See: Bryman, Disney and His Worlds, 113–26; Roger Swagler, “Evolution and Applications of the
Term Consumerism: Theme and Variations,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs 28, no. 2 (1994): 347–
60; Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality, 43; Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven
Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xii–xiii.
17. Disney’s vision of progress through technology comes loaded with a good dose of nostalgia
for  the  values  of  small-town  Middle  America  –  so  much  so  that  Margaret  King  speaks  of
“traditional values in futuristic form.” See: Margaret J. King, “Disneyland and Walt Disney World:
Traditional Values in Futuristic Form,” The Journal of Popular Culture 15, no. 1 (June 1981): 116–40.
18. To  drive  its  point  even  further,  Disneyland  Paris’s  Main  Street  arranges  its  commercial
environment into a sequence, so that as visitors walk down the street, the bicycle shop later
gives way to a car dealership, while gas lamps slowly transition to electric lighting. In other
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words,  walking down Main Street  allows visitors  to follow the linear and bump-free path of
technological progress – one essentially associated with business and economic development.
Disneyland Paris’s Emporium likewise features a stained glass dome, adorned with the portraits
of  Thomas Edison,  George Eastman,  and assorted inventor-entrepreneurs,  tying together  the
themes of entrepreneurship, technological progress, and consumption.
19. Wright, The Imagineering Field Guide to Magic Kingdom, 22.
20. Wright, The Imagineering Field Guide to Magic Kingdom, 30.
21. To some extent, those deals drew from Disney’s experience with ABC – a partnership critical
to Disneyland’s opening. The network took a minority stake in exchange for Disney’s first regular
television program, allowing Walt Disney to use his Disneyland Show to advertise his soon-to-
open park to television audiences across the country.
22. As a 1953 training manual notes, “Most of Main Street’s shops are operated by companies
that  were  business  pioneers  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  and  all  buildings  and  interiors  are
designed to fit the decor of this era.” WED Enterprises, “Disneyland: Where You Leave Today,”
7.1.
23. As the above-quoted manual explains: “The Disney Team is much larger than just the Disney
organizations. In addition, we have over sixty-eight other firms playing a vital part in our team
effort to bring happiness to our guests. Some are small, specialized individual operators; some
are huge companies  such as  Swift  &Co. –  the Bank of  America  – United Paramount  Theater
(which you hear as UPT) – Carnation – Richfield – General Dynamics – Crane – and many others.”
Most individual lessees were gone by the end of the decade. See: WED Enterprises, “Disneyland:
Where You Leave Today,” 1.5.
24. In this area, the park suffered a few misfires, as shops – at least initially – were “operated
first and foremost as part of the [Disneyland] show,” with only limited concern for profitability (
Koenig, Realityland, 109). The independently-run lingerie, china or shoe stores which Walt, in a
nod to the real thing, insisted his Main Street have, were thus gone after a few years. Still, the
same logic applied at Orlando’s Magic Kingdom park (open 1971), where the antiques shop made
$100,000 a year but allegedly spent ten times more. 
See: Karal Ann Marling, “Imagineering the Disney Theme Parks,” in Designing Disney’s Theme Parks:
The Architecture of Reassurance, ed. Karal Ann Marling (New York: Rizzoli / Flammarion, 1998), 90;
Koenig, Realityland, 111.
25. Those  prohibitively  expensive  participant  contracts  were  seldom welcome  by  the  parks’
purchasing department, which frequently noticed that suppliers, in the absence of competitive
bids, typically overcharged Disney: “‘Operation versus Participant Affairs is like day and night,’
agreed Bob Ziegler, who worked both sides. ‘Foods didn’t want to be told they had to use Coke,
not  Pepsi.’  […]  [Then  head  of  the  purchasing  department  Howard]  Roland  thought  that,  by
eliminating competitive bids, the participant contracts allowed suppliers to take advantage of
Disney.  ‘We constantly  fought  that  battle,’  Roland said.  ‘We could  only  use  Coca-Cola,  Oscar
Mayer hot dogs,  and Borden milk,  so sometimes the sponsors made up their sponsor fees in
overcharges.’” (Koenig, Realityland, 164–65) 
26. The least  furnished of all  lands upon Disneyland’s  opening in 1955 (possibly because the
farthest removed from Disney’s usual brand of movies), Tomorrowland stood to benefit the most
from corporate sponsorships and free exhibitions. As described in 1953, the land was slated to
open  with  no less  than  six  corporate  exhibitions  (seven,  including  Monsanto’s  House  of
Tomorrow, originally located slightly outside Tomorrowland). Those were: Monsanto’s Hall of
Chemistry,  whose “display shows how chemistry affects  every day living – in food,  clothing,
shelter, and health today – and some of the possibilities chemistry has in store tomorrow; the
Monsanto  Home  of  the  Future,  the  “World’s  most-remarkable  all-plastic  house”;  the  Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp, “an educational and entertaining display giving the complete story
of aluminum – from beginning to the present – and into the future”, Crane Co’s “display showing
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the ‘Bathroom of Tomorrow’ and laundry room of the future”; or Richfield Oil Corp’s “The World
Beneath Us” – a show including “a cartoon story (produced by W[alt] D[isney] P[roductions]) of
the development of the earth; a diorama model of the entire Los Angeles basin; and a working
model of an underground oil reservoir.” 
See: WED Enterprises, “Disneyland: Where You Leave Today,” 6.8-6.9.
27. Koenig, Realityland, 153.
28. Such was the association between television, advertisement, and consumerism that Robert
Sarnoff, president of NBC, notably declared in 1956: “The reason we have such a high standard of
living is because advertising has created an American frame of mind that makes people want
more  things,  better  things,  and  newer  things.”  As  explained  in  footnote  21,  Walt  Disney
understood the commercial promises of television all too well and, in 1954, branched into the
medium mostly to advertise his soon-to-open theme park.
See:  “History:  1950s,”  AdAge.com,  September  15,  2003,  http://adage.com/article/adage-
encyclopedia/history-1950s/98701/.
29. Much in the way that the names of products were directly incorporated into television series
titles  (such  as  General  Electric  Theater,  1953–62,  or  Chevrolet  on  Broadway,  1956),  so  did
attractions prominently feature the name of their corporate sponsors (for example: “Adventure
Thru Inner Space, presented by Monsanto”).
30. In the words of Victor Gruen, an architect and key promoter of the shopping mall in 1950s
and 1960s America, “merchandising” means “the selection and location of tenant types or,  if
possible, specific tenants on the renting plan … to create a situation in which each member of the
retail entity — the owner, the tenant, and the shopper — functions in a manner that benefits
each of the others.” As such, it represents “a rare occurrence in our free enterprise economy —
the banding together of individual businesses in cooperative fashion with the aim of creating
greater commercial effectiveness through unified endeavor.” See: Victor Gruen, Shopping Towns
USA: The Planning of Shopping Centers (New York: Reinhold Pub. Corp, 1960), 131, 139.
31. As the table suggests, other sectors of industry represented in Disneyland included air travel
(TWA,  McDouglas),  consumer  electronics,  and  information  and  communications  technologies
(Wurlitzer, Bell, General Electric).
32. As Richard Foglesong notes, those attractions – General Electric’s Carousel of Progress, Ford’s
Magic Skyways, “Pepsi-Cola Presents Walt Disney’s ‘It’s a Small World’—a Salute to UNICEF and
the World’s Children”, and the State of Illinois’s Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln – proved a
major draw with audiences, collectively attracting 90% of all visitors to the Fair. Set to the song
“There’s  a  Great  Big  Beautiful  Tomorrow,”  General  Electric’s  Carousel  of  Progress  notably
consisted in a theater rotating past four stationary audio-animatronic tableaus, all of which
featured the same family delighting in the advances of technology, from the early 20th century to
the 1960s. See: Richard E. Foglesong, Married to the Mouse:  Walt Disney World and Orlando (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 36.
33. By charging “primary sponsors” a minimum of $35 million for a ten-year lease, the Walt
Disney Company expected the 6 to 10 projected participants to shoulder approximately half of all
costs required for the construction of EPCOT. United Technology and Metropolitan Life Insurance
paid $60 and $72 million for their twelve-year lease on The Living Seas and Wonders of Life
pavilions.  As  Pete  Clark,  head of  corporate  sponsorships,  explains:  “Companies  were used to
spending money on a single show. […] The figure—$35 million for a ten-year contract—we just
grabbed out of the air. They would all have a product area, which would be their cost to staff.”
Koenig, Realityland, 168.
34. Dave Parfitt, “Marty Sklar Discusses Working With And For Walt Disney | The DIS Unplugged
Disney Blog,”  Disney Unplugged,  March 22,  2011,  http://www.disunplugged.com/2009/12/18/
marty-sklar-discusses-working-with-and-for-walt-disney/. 
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35. In both versions of the attraction’s script, alternatives to oil are presented as experimental,
while solutions for the continued use of oil are emphasized. The 1982 script notably reads: “It’s a
supply that is  not inexhaustible,  however,  not as the global  demand for energy—all  kinds of
energy—continues to increase. Most countries must depend on the uncertainties of imported oil
until the big breakthroughs finally happen. But the world can’t simply ‘park its cars’ or ‘turn off
its lights’ until that day. We must continue to conserve and extend today’s energy sources and
develop a broad mix of alternatives for the future. Already, current supplies are being stretched
through the use of heat-sensing monitors and other new systems which help increase energy
conservation. At the same time, special oil recovery techniques are helping to bring older fields
back to life.” 
When the show was refurbished in 1996, it reopened as Ellen’s Energy Adventure (after Ellen
DeGeneres, the attraction’s protagonist). Emphasizing the practicality of oil over other energy
sources, the newer script minimizes the depletion of oil reserves: “We’re far from running on
empty. And we’ve got some pretty far-out ways of finding more.”
36. For a first-hand account of the Disney corporation’s efforts to secure funding from national
governments, see former president of Disneyland Jack Lundquist’s memoir: Lindquist and Combs,
In Service to the Mouse.
37. By  requiring  sponsors  to  shoulder  somewhere  between  80  to  90%  of  their  pavilion’s
construction costs, the Walt Disney Company left EPCOT’s completion dangerously exposed to
the corporations’ participation. As Imagineer Tony Baxter explains about Exxon: “I remember
decisions that were made, such as to go or not to go on the Energy pavilion concept, which was
extraordinary and was going to cost a fortune. […] The thing was, if we lost Exxon, we lost EPCOT.
It was that simple. There was no margin for losing anything. It was like the more you got out of a
sponsor, the more colossal or stupendous [their pavilion] could be.” Koenig, Realityland, 182.
38. Tim Onosko, “Tomorrow Lands,” OMNI, September 1982.
39. Sklar, Dream It! Do It!, 178.
40. By the mid-1960s, the urban crisis had become so apparent that, in the absence of significant
improvements at the hands of the government (at both the federal or state levels), new avenues
opened for private companies to offer solutions to the public problem of unplanned growth.
(Sprawl  itself  resulted  in  part  from  federal  policies  promoting  homeownership,  with
government-subsidized loans, or extending highways, with the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 1956).
As a result, Disney’s vision for his Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow was but one
of numerous developments in the area of privately-run and -designed new towns. With many
similarities noted between parks and shopping malls, Walt Disney unsurprisingly turned to James
Rouse or Victor Gruen for inspiration. Both men had gone from mall-designers and -developers
to new-town promoters, and hoped that some of the principles behind their successful shopping
centers  might  now  be  applied  to  entire,  fully  functional  communities  or  even  decaying
downtowns. James Rouse, whose 1967 new town of Columbia was a pioneering effort in that area,
thus met with Disney on several occasions to discuss Epcot. Walt Disney likewise proved quite
influenced by Gruen’s 1964 Heart of our Cities, and so does Epcot bear a striking resemblance with
Gruen’s proposal for Washington D.C.’s bid for the 1964 World Fair. Both share the same below-
ground transit and service infrastructures, the same vast green expanses above, as well as the
same circular layout. 
Public response to Disney’s ambitions in the area of urban planning was enthusiastic. Much in
keeping with Rouse’s celebration of Disneyland as “the greatest piece of urban design in the
United States today” (in a 1963 conference at Harvard University), a slew of 1970s newspapers
titles proclaimed or asked: “Mickey Mouse for Mayor”, “Mickey Mouse Teaches the Architect,” or
“Should We Let Disney Redesign LA?” This,  Disney more or less did at Anaheim, after Walt’s
grand vision for Epcot died alongside its progenitor (others in the company – starting with his
brother  Roy,  the  company’s  CEO –  remained mostly  unconvinced).  Yet  again  walking  in  the
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footsteps of Gruen and Rouse and taking its cue from Jon Jerde’s 1993 Universal CityWalk at
Universal City, the Walt Disney Company set out to provide chiefly suburban Anaheim with a
downtown of its own. This effort took the form of Downtown Disney (opened 2001), an open-air,
pedestrian shopping mall located at the foot of its two theme parks at Disneyland Resort.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper sets out to examine ways in which the Disney company has come to enlist the help of
private corporations in the design and operation of its theme parks, allowing the products and
messages  of  large  industrial  conglomerates  to  take  on  increasing  prominence  the  parks’
environment. In their celebration of the free enterprise system, the parks have striven to not
only  create  environments  especially  conducive  to  consumption  but  also  extol  private
corporations as engines of progress. Disney’s efforts to repackage industry help shed light on the
media’s role in a capitalist economy – namely, the promotion not just of individual companies
but of a brand of capitalism most readily acceptable by the public. 
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